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In contemporary linguistics, both cognitive and critical 
approaches to language have been elaborated in some detail. 
Unfortunately, the two perspectives have seldom converged, despite 
the potential theoretical advances such collaboration offers. Although 
historically and sociologically understandable, this separation of fields 
is bound to block progress. Only a handful of researchers and scholars 
in literature, music, film, esthetics, and art history have been 
attempting to follow and engage with developments in cognitive 
neuroscience. This represents a lost opportunity for scientists no less 
than for humanists, as critics and theorists of the arts are uniquely 
trained to pose questions and adduce examples that could bring more 
rigor and refinement, as well as cultural resonance, to the new 
sciences of mind. 
 
This paper explores important and fruitful links between 
cognitive neuroscience and discourse. By adopting a non-reductive 
approach to literary and other cultural artifacts as records of high-level 
cognitive functioning evoking complex responses in their audiences, it 
seeks to contribute towards a more explicit and candid discussion of 
the methodologies that employ linguistic insights and analysis 
procedures in order to address cognitive representations and 
processes. Particularly, its goal is to eventuate, not in a set of answers, 
but in a set of pointed and provocative questions for further 
consideration and research. 
 
The specific research questions addressed in this article are the 
following: 
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1) How can cognitive processes be accessed and understood 
sufficiently to enable reliable models to discourse analysis? 
2) What practical problems challenge the design of a good 
discourse-relevant neuro-imaging study, or to develop a theory of 
discourse comprehension that takes into account what we know about 
language, about cognition, and about the brain? 
 
Historically, research on language is at the roots of cognitive 
science. In the 1970s, relevant psycholinguistic models emerged, 
including pragmatics and discourse processing theories, which 
proposed an analysis of language beyond its basic structural facets. 
For example, speech acts model, proposed by Searle (1969), and the 
text organization model, proposed by van Dijk and Kintsch (1978), 
served as the basis for theories on pragmatics and discourse adopted 
today. Although these models could be an important theoretical basis 
for the assessment of language production and comprehension, 
language remains a topic scarcely studied by neuropsychologists 
compared with other cognitive processes. 
 
Discourse analysis is a broad and fast-developing 
interdisciplinary field concerned with the study of language use in 
context which emerged between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s in such 
disciplines as anthropology, ethnography, microsociology, cognitive 
and social psychology, poetics, rhetoric, stylistics, linguistics, 
semiotics, and other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences 
(van Dijk, 2000). 
 
Cognitive neuroscience comprises a wide field of investigation, 
encompassing an array of complementary domains like physiological 
psychology and neurobiology. It may be seen as perhaps the most 
promising and exciting intellectual initiative of the new century. 
Cognitive neuroscience is concerned with the scientific study of 
biological substrates underlying cognition, with a specific focus on the 
neural substrates of mental processes, and addresses questions of how 
psychological functions are produced by the brain. 
 
Keywords: Discourse and cognition, Mind and brain, Semio-pragmatics, 
neuro-imaging methodology, socio-cultural analysis.   
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1. Problem and context 
 
Linguists and literary theorists have proceeded in theory 
building on discourses and language processing. Each presents his 
own individually tailored list of element, aspects, components, strata, 
layers, levels, or facets that together make a discourse what it is. 
However, some of the existing theories chose to concentrate on only 
certain facets of cognition and structures of discourses. Those facets 
are of interest to a certain specialty or amenable to formal analysis. In 
particular, linguists frequently concentrate on sentence structure, 
ignoring narrative structures, characterization, metaphor, and other 
distinctly literary concerns. Conversely, literary analysts seldom make 
much of grammar or morphology. In my analysis I intend to 
encompass both literary and more linguistic specialties. 
 
In contemporary linguistics, both cognitive and critical 
approaches to language have been elaborated in some detail. 
Unfortunately, the two perspectives have seldom converged, despite 
the potential theoretical advances such collaboration offers. Although 
historically and sociologically understandable, this separation of fields 
is bound to block progress. Only a handful of researchers and scholars 
in literature, music, film, esthetics, and art history have been 
attempting to follow and engage with developments in cognitive 
neuroscience. This represents a lost opportunity for scientists no less 
than for humanists, as critics and theorists of the arts are uniquely 
trained to pose questions and adduce examples that could bring more 
rigor and refinement, as well as cultural resonance, to the new 
sciences of mind. 
 
As the 21st Century opened, Neuropsychology focused on the 
investigation of brain and cognitive processes (Bennett & Hacker, 
2007). These two domains can be reconciled in a hybrid science that 
brings them together into a synthesis more powerful than anything 
researchers have achieved before. In this paper the project of setting 
up a hybrid science demands the dissolution of the mind-discourse 
problem, somehow setting it aside as an illusion, based on a mistaken 
presupposition. 




Historically, research on language is at the roots of cognitive 
science. In the 1970s, relevant psycholinguistic models emerged, 
including pragmatics and discourse processing theories, which 
proposed an analysis of language beyond its basic structural facets. 
For example, speech acts model, proposed by Searle (1969), and the 
text organization model, proposed by van Dijk and Kintsch (1978), 
served as the basis for theories on pragmatics and discourse adopted 
today. Although these models could be an important theoretical basis 
for the assessment of language production and comprehension, 
language remains a topic scarcely studied by neuropsychologists 
compared with other cognitive processes. 
 
On the technological side, recent developments in neuro-
imaging techniques are providing new tools to investigate neural 
structure, chemistry and function, and developments in machine-
mediated text analysis tools, storage, and search capacities have made 
corpus-based discourse studies much more doable. The new 
technologies can make changes observable and measurable, and so 
present new possibilities both for understanding brain–behavior 
relationships and, consequently, for developing new therapies to help 
people with neurological/speech disorders or injuries. The absence of 
explicit knowledge of discourse patterns may be partly because 
research and practice associating neurocognitive function with 
language has tended to focus on (often isolated) linguistic ‘deficits’ as 
signs or symptoms of brain injury or disorder rather than beginning 
with comprehensive descriptions of discourse. 
 
As the brain is doing a lot at the same time, in whatever way we 
try to measure its activity, we will find a lot of noise. So, there is no 
escape from forming precise (and falsifiable) hypotheses, in which a 
theory becomes our eyes - without it researchers are blind. This 
simply implies that we have to figure out what the brain does in order 
to be able to figure out how the brain does it; and we have to figure 
out how the brain does things in order to figure out how it can do what 
it does. The main danger is not being precise enough on either side. 
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2. Aims and methods 
 
This paper explores important and fruitful links between 
cognitive neuroscience and discourse. By adopting a non-reductive 
approach to literary and other cultural artifacts as records of high-level 
cognitive functioning evoking complex responses in their audiences, it 
seeks to contribute towards a more explicit and candid discussion of 
the methodologies that employ linguistic insights and analysis 
procedures in order to address cognitive representations and 
processes. Particularly, its goal is to eventuate, not in a set of answers, 
but in a set of pointed and provocative questions for further 
consideration and research. Our framework aims at three things: 
completeness, expandability/flexibility, and justifiability. 
 
The specific research questions addressed in this article are the 
following: 
3) How can cognitive processes be accessed and understood 
sufficiently to enable reliable models to discourse analysis? 
4) What practical problems challenge the design of a good 
discourse-relevant neuro-imaging study, or to develop a theory of 
discourse comprehension that takes into account what we know about 
language, about cognition, and about the brain? 
 
People have been analyzing discourses, in some sense, for as 
long as they have been speaking. 
They have done so without the help of linguists, literary critics, 
or their theories. But a theoretical framework can still perform a 
service in making explicit what is normally implicit. In this paper, I 
will attempt to illustrate some frameworks for classifying and 
cataloguing everything that goes on in the production and 
comprehension of discourses from a neurocognitive perspective. With 
minor modifications, the same framework should also be applicable to 
nonverbal human behavior. It will thus be interest to semioticians as 
well as literary theorists, though its roots are primarily in linguistics. 
In this paper, I also intend to outline the mapping of neurophysiology 
to learning styles as a unification of theory and practice, a synthesis 
that is essential for effective teaching and learning. 
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Accordingly, our objectives in the present study are to: (a) 
Relate Neurocognition and Linguistic Architecture; (b) find links 
between Linguistic Theory and Neural Activity; (c) map between 
linguistic operations and neurocognitive processes; (d) Explain how 
language structure and neurocognitive organization can meet; (e) 
Provide some background on current approaches ; (f) Present a 
number of issues on which current discussions focus; and finally (g) 
Fundamentals of Linguistics against a neurocognitive background. 
 
3. Background: the cognitive neuroscience movement 
 
There has been considerable interest in recent years in whether, 
and if so to what degree, research in neuroscience can contribute to 
philosophical studies of mind, epistemology, language, art and 
discourse. This interest has manifested itself in a range of research in 
the philosophy of marketing, language, and visual art that draws on 
results from studies in neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience. 
 
Cognitive neuroscience is concerned with the scientific study of 
biological substrates underlying cognition, with a specific focus on the 
neural substrates of mental processes, and addresses questions of how 
psychological functions are produced by the brain. It is a branch of 
both psychology and neuroscience, overlapping with disciplines like 
physiological psychology, cognitive psychology and 
neuropsychology. Cognitive neuroscience relies upon theories in 
cognitive science coupled with evidence from neuropsychology and 
computational modelling. 
 
Cognitive neuroscience comprises a wide field of investigation, 
encompassing an array of complementary domains. Among these 
domains is neuropsychology, which emerged from lesion studies, and 
its relationship language, first reported in 1861 by the French 
neurologist Paul Broca. This field has been increasingly developed 
worldwide. A very important field of research in neuropsychology is 
neuropsychological assessment. This research domain has a strong 
interface with neuropsycholinguistics, because of the fact that 
language is both the vehicle to convey the assessment and the focus of 
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investigation in verbal instruments, meaning that language is used 
evaluate language itself.  
 
Despite its importance to cognitive neuroscience and to this 
subarea of neuropsychological assessment, language appears not to be 
one of the most studied cognitive processes by neuropsychologists. In 
the 1970s, relevant psycholinguistic models emerged, including 
pragmatics and discourse processing theories, which proposed an 
analysis of language beyond its basic structural facets. For example, 
speech acts model, proposed by Searle (1969), and the text 
organization model, proposed by van Dijk and Kintsch (1978), served 
as the basis for theories on pragmatics and discourse adopted today. 
Although these models could be an important theoretical basis for the 
assessment of language production and comprehension, language 
remains a topic scarcely studied by neuropsychologists compared with 
other cognitive processes. 
 
Among the sources of knowledge about language processing are 
experiments, quasi-experiments, and case studies that use healthy 
samples and neurological or psychiatric subjects that provide 
behavioral data from standardized general cognitive or language 
evaluation tools and neuroimaging data from structured discourse 
contexts. 
 
People use symbolic systems of various kinds as instruments for 
thought. However, many philosophers and psychologists have 
believed that thought exists independently of the symbolic forms in 
which it is clothed and by means of which it is expressed. Language, 
though of great importance, is not the only medium of cognition. 
Sometimes a cognitive act, such as deciding which dish to choose 
from the menu, is achieved by manipulating symbols of other kinds, 
such as images and mental pictures. Sometimes symbols have a 
material embodiment in compasses and maps. Language use is not 
only public, as in conversation, producing an interpersonal realm of 
meanings. But there is also a private realm of human experience, and 
private uses of symbolic systems that play a key part in its production. 
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Discourse analysis emerged as a new transdisciplinary field of 
study between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s in such disciplines as 
anthropology, ethnography, microsociology, cognitive and social 
psychology, poetics, rhetoric, stylistics, linguistics, semiotics, and 
other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences interested in the 
systematic study of the structures, functions, and processing of text 
and talk (for details, see the contributions in van Dijk, 1985b). 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century the main question about 
the relationship between language and cognition was whether the 
grammatical structure or vocabulary of our language influenced 
thought processes. Cognitive science introduced a new question: are 
language and cognition similar or distinct human abilities? The last 50 
years have seen considerable controversy on this question, mirroring 
the development within cognitive science of two fundamentally 
different conceptions of the cognitive architecture. The tradition of 
artificial intelligence emphasized general-purpose problem solving 
abilities, while the tradition of linguistics and philosophy let to an 
emphasis on distinctive modules. 
 
There are four different theoretical perspectives on the language 
–cognition relationship. The view at the beginning of the twentieth 
century appears to be best captured by the idea that cognition and 
language have complex similarities and differences, and both develop 
over the human span from genetic factors constrained by 
environmental input and cultural learning. It may be possible to set 
aside the question of whether language is distinct from cognition and 
whether the brain is composed of distinct mental modules. The 
theorist Howard Gardner has noted a growing consensus about the 
importance of a new set of questions about how to divide up the grand 
areas of mind and brain. Scientists are emphasizing the distinction 
between areas of human ability that are available to all humans and 
played a part in the evolution of our species (such as language and 
basic number use), and areas requiring cultural elaboration (such as 
algebra and the ability to play musical instruments). The era of 
simplistic statements about the language-cognition relationship is 
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drawing to a close, as cognitive scientists begin to deliver on the 
promise of a truly interdisciplinary approach to understanding the 
mind-brain. 
 
By 2000, the cognitive linguistics movement had grown into an 
enduring subfield, but it has remained outside the mainstream of 
linguistics. While some cognitive linguists have remained focused on 
specific linguistic questions, others have addressed questions in an 
interdisciplinary manner, drawing on experimental psychology, brain 
science, and category induction by artificial neural networks. 
 
The field of cognitive neuroscience emerged from work in 
neuroscience and cognitive science. Cognitive neuroscience differs 
from basic neuroscience by having the goal of explaining complex 
cognitive abilities, but rejects the tradition of artificial intelligence 
(and much of cognitive science) that one can understand cognition 
abstractly, without reference to its neural underpinnings. In the 1990s 
some cognitive neuroscientists argued that basic aspects of the 
language cognition relationship, such as the autonomy of syntax 
hypothesis and the innateness and modularity of language, could be 
evaluated from neuro-scientific point of view. 
 
Neurobiologists noted that developing neural tissue is very 
plastic. Like other aspects of cognition, language acquisition is 
heavily dependent on experience. The neurobiological evidence thus 
may run counter to what would be expected under the autonomy of 
syntax hypothesis. There is no known way that genes could encode for 
concepts like subject-and –verb. Cognitive neuroscientist share a view 
of language that resonates with cognitive linguists: they emphasize the 
joint-development of language and perceptu-motor processes, with 
language acquisition understood to be semantically driven and 
embodied. 
 
Literary studies and the cognitive sciences, pursuing common 
interests in language, mental acts, and linguistic artifacts, have 
developed markedly different approaches to similar phenomena of 
reading, imaginative involvement, and textual patterning. Until quite 
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recently, the distance between them has drawn more attention than 
their possible convergence (Franchi and Guzeldere 1994). A number 
of literary theorists and critics, however, have steadily been producing 
work that finds its inspiration, its methodology, and its guiding 
paradigms through a dialogue with one or more fields within cognitive 
science: artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, post- Chomskian 
linguistics, philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and evolutionary 
biology.  
 
Reuven Tsur (1992) has been developing his ‘‘cognitive 
poetics’’ since the 1980s; the prominent psychoanalytic critic Norman 
Holland (1986: 6) demonstrated the advantages of attending to the 
‘‘more powerful psychology’’ emerging from cognitive neuroscience 
in 1988; Mark Turner (1991: viii) advanced his far-reaching project of 
a ‘‘cognitive rhetoric’’ in 1991_; and Ellen Spolsky (1993: 4) 
trenchantly brought a theory of ‘‘cognitive instability’’ to bear on 
literary interpretation in 1993. 
 
While this insight is not new, linguistic knowledge about 
systematic principles of language structure and use has not yet been 
integrated sufficiently in cognitive science research. In this field, 
questions about human concepts and thought processes are often 
addressed by using various kinds of unconstrained verbalizations. The 
method Cognitive Discourse Analysis (CODA) provides a framework 
for utilizing linguistic insights for the analysis of such data, by 
investigating patterns of language use in relation to the situation in 
which language is produced. Relevant studies involve situations or 
tasks that highlight central aspects of mental representation and 
problem solving processes. Both of these relate to and enhance well 
established research traditions in distinct ways. 
 
 
4. Towards new method of inquiry 
 
One of the greatest fascinations—and most challenging 
problems—is to know how our brains create and use language 
(Mildner, 2008). After decades of earnest study in a variety of 
disciplines e.g., neurology, psychology, psycholinguistics, 
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neurolinguistics, to name a few, the problem of the brain and language 
is now addressed especially by the vigorous interdisciplinary specialty 
of cognitive neuroscience. This specialty seeks to understand the 
neural systems that underlie cognitive processes, thereby taking into 
its intellectual grasp the dual complexities of neuroscience and 
cognition. 
 
Science is a procession of technology, experiment, and theory. 
From early work that relied on “accidents of nature” (brain damage 
resulting in language disorders) to modern investigations using 
sophisticated imaging methods, the path to knowledge has been 
diligently pursued. As we noted above, in the last thirty years, a 
profoundly different view of how we compose and understand 
language has taken shape: the metaphor of the brain as computer has 
shifted to an embodied and creative brain. An application of the 
cognitive sciences to discourse studies, then, has much to offer. 
 
Cognitive science has been influential in literature, music, and 
creativity for some time. There are books recently published or 
forthcoming that use cognitive theory to rethink the medieval period 
for example, or that situate the early modern period within a material 
framework that includes the materiality of the brain. Perhaps the 
greatest value of this interplay is in the avenues for research it opens 
up. Some of the avenues of research have already been called for: as 
discussed elsewhere in this book, F. Elizabeth Hart has called for a 
materialist linguistics; Bruce McConachie argues for the value of 
cognitive studies in historiography; Rhonda Blair has called upon 
cognitive science to inform acting theory. And more work remains. 
 
In large part, the generative theory of language has been 
replaced by the cognitive linguistic theories applied here. Cognitive 
linguists broke away from the generative grammar theory because it 
failed to answer how meaning was made in poetry. The paradigm shift  
between seeing the brain as a computer, with input undergoing 
algorithmic processing, and viewing it more as part of an organism, 
shaping and being shaped by its environment, is beginning to have a 
profound impact on various fields. 
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Cognitive science is the term that gets blanketed over various 
fields that look at the interaction between the mind, brain, body, 
language, and environment. It includes research from neurology, 
psychology, computer science, linguistics, and philosophy. Despite an 
effort to communicate and unify across the disciplines, there are major 
rifts within cognitive science stemming from different foundational 
assumptions as well as methodological differences. Of course the 
neurosciences are focused at the level of neurons while linguists are 
focusing on behavior, so a lack of connection between such areas 
might be unsurprising. 
 
By the second decade of the 20th century it has become clear 
that the nervous system was built of dynamically polarized nerve 
cells, whose axons and dendrites were organized into groups, and 
made specific neural connections by means of synapses (Mildner, 
2008). In the 1930s the first motor and sensory maps were produced, 
and it became obvious that each sensory modality has more than one 
of those maps. 
 
After WorldWar II different methods of imaging and 
quantifying these connections were designed (more on that in chapter 
4, this volume). The obtained results and techniques ensured better 
understanding of brain physiology and changed the approach to 
speech and language. However, the key question—does the brain 
function as a whole or as a set of independent parts—continues to be 
debated. 
 
According to Kosslyn and Andersen (1992), it seems plausible 
that simple processes are localized, whereas complex functions such 
as perception, language and others are more widely distributed (as 
cited in Gazzaniga et al., 2002).This simple distinction does not solve 
the problem, of course. Rather, it moves it to a different plane: to the 
question of the level of complexity at which a process is localized, or 
at what point it becomes complex enough to warrant wider 
distribution. 
 
Cook (2010) assures that language does something; it is not just 
a system of signs and signifiers that we use to narrate and describe 
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events and actions in the real world. He adds: “It is creative and banal 
and works to reveal and shape our thought; therefore, a study of 
language is a study of how we think” (p. 150). The categories we use 
to organize information can be changed, both linguistically and 
cognitively, and often have to be, when new information or ideas 
arrive, which prove them inadequate or inaccurate. 
 
It became clear that the brain is for more than thinking and that 
it is not a whole discreet organ but an organism with parts. To 
understand a production/reception of any discourse requires an 
extraordinary cognitive and biological feat. An obvious example is 
how theater audiences process extraordinarily complex information 
without getting lost. Because the seemingly simple ability to watch, 
understand, appreciate, and be moved by a theatrical production 
involves elements of our biology, an investigation into these questions 
will encounter research in science. 
 
The conceptual metaphor theory of George Lakoff (and others) 
and the conceptual blending theory of Gilles Fauconnier (and others) 
suggested a rereading of how reading is about manipulating symbols 
and meaning. If this is not how we make meaning, then we have an 
obligation to reinvestigate our old assumptions and readings of texts. 
One of the important consequences of understanding that we create 
linguistic and conceptual categories is seeing how categories can slip, 
expand, constrict, and change. In other words, processing the 
metaphoric sentences required more of the brain to participate. These 
sentences require a different idea of meaning creation and 
categorization. 
 
5. Neurocognitive Methodological Prerequisites 
 
There is no single ‘‘perfect’’ method for the examination of 
psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic questions. Neither are behavioral 
methods superior to neurocognitive methods because they have been 
available to the field for a longer period of time, nor do 
neurocognitive methods provide definitive answers to processing 
questions simply because they are ‘‘closer’’ to the brain. Rather, all 
methods are associated with their own particular strengths and 
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weaknesses. For this reason, investigators believe that true insights 
into the language processing architecture can only be gained from an 
integrative perspective, in which a variety of methods are compared 
and contrasted. 
 
The unveiling of the brain through methods such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography has 
satisfied a scientific quest to depict the neural activity associated with 
specific types of language processing. Today we stand at a remarkable 
confluence of information, including behavioral experiments on 
normal language functioning, clinical descriptions of neurogenic 
speech and language disorders, and neuroimaging of language 
processes in the intact living brain. But the profound potential of this 
synthesis is difficult to realize because the knowledge is spread across 
a huge number of journals and books. 
 
1 Methods with a high temporal resolution 
1.1 Electroencephalography (EEG) 
1.2 Magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
2 Methods with a high spatial resolution 
2.1 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
2.2 Positron emission tomography (PET) 
2.3 Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
3 Correlations in neurocognitive data 
3.1 Correlations between time and space 
3.2 Correlations between neurocognitive patterns and functions: 
The one-to-one mapping 
problem 
4 The output: Behavioral methods 
4.1 Judgments 
4.2 Speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT) 
4.3 ‘‘Online’’ methods 
 
1. Clinical Studies 
1.1. Studies of Split-Brain Patients 
2. Cortical Stimulation 
2.1. Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
Cognitive neuroscience and discourse studies                   El-Khitab : n° 14 
 
19 
3. Wada Test 
4. Neuroradiological Methods 
4.1. Computerized (Axial) Tomography—C(A)T 
4.2. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
4.3. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
5. Recording of Activity 
5.1. Electrophysiological Methods 
5.2. Single-Unit or Single-Cell Recording 
5.3. Electroencephalography (EEG) 
5.4. Event-Related Potentials (ERP) 
5.5. Cortical Cartography 
5.6. Magnetoencephalography (MEG) 
6. Radioisotopic Methods 
6.1. Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 
6.2. Single-Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) 
7. Ultrasound Methods 
7.1. Functional Transcranial Doppler Ultrasonography (fTCD) 
8. Behavioral Methods 
8.1. Paper-and-Pencil Tests 
8.2. Word Association Tests 
8.3. Stroop Test 
8.4. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
8.5. Priming and Interference 
8.6. Shadowing 
8.7. Gating 
8.8. Dichotic Listening 
8.9. Divided Visual Field 
8.10. Dual Tasks 
9. Aphasia Test Batteries 
 
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky & Schlesewsky (2009) claim that 
ascertaining the precise relationship between neurocognitive methods 
and behavioral methods is essential for several reasons. Firstly, only a 
more precise understanding of these correspondences will allow for a 
‘‘unification’’ of psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic research. This is 
by no means a trivial matter (see, for example, Sereno and Rayner 
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2003; Bornkessel and Schlesewsky 2006a, for a discussion of the 
problems involved in establishing correspondences between ERPs and 
eyetracking). 
 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the research conducted during the 
last years, we have come a long way in understanding how different 
experimental methods work and how they are related to one another. 
This is also an important step with respect to the question of how 
different data types might serve to inform linguistic theory. For 
example, systematic crossmethod comparisons have revealed that 
linguistic judgments incorporate a range of different influences, thus 
questioning whether this data type – at least when considered in 
isolation – is indeed suited to revealing linguistic competence in an 
‘‘unadulterated’’ manner (for discussion, see Bornkessel- 
Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky 2007). However, independently of the 
type of data under consideration, psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic 
methods cannot decide which data types are important for linguistic 
theory-building. This is rather a matter of choice for the developers of 
each individual theory: if a theory does not seek to be 
‘‘psychologically adequate’’ (in the sense of Dik 1991), it needn’t – 
and shouldn’t – concern itself with processing facts. 
 
The continued evolution of cognitive neuroscience is mainly 
driven by innovative applications of particular techniques. Many of 
these new neuroscience approaches clearly require, and have only 
been made possible in later years by, a dramatic increase in computing 
power. Senior, Russell, and Gazzaniga (2006) confirm that the many 
different ways one can now investigate human brain function allow 
one to take snapshots of structure and function from different 
perspectives. They explain further the particular snapshot one sees as 
determined by the temporal and spatial resolution of the technique 
being used and by whether one is recording activity from the brain or 
trying to interfere with or stimulate the brain to change stimulus 
processing or behavioral responses. 
 
The relative spatial and temporal resolutions of various 
neuroimaging and recording techniques at one’s disposal are vast. The 
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correct level at which to examine brain function depends on what one 
wants to know, and what one wants to know depends on what is 
already believed. Each of these different techniques can best be 
thought of as inhabiting a distinct problem space. Some known 
limitations include being aware that 1) faster or smaller spatial 
sampling isn’t always better; 2) brain activations may be misleading; 
3) TMS effects may be due to secondary activations; techniques 
shouldn’t necessarily give converging evidence. 
 
6. Principles, Theories and Models of the Nervous System 
Structure 
 
On the basis of systematic characteristics, the principles of 
structure, development, and functioning of the nervous system are 
established. Mildner (2008) detailed in this respect that these 
principles serve as starting point for the design of theories and models. 
Empirical and experimental tests and evaluations of theories and 
models complement existing knowledge. This, in turn, enables us to 
develop new principles or modify them in such a way that we come to 
have new models or new versions of the old ones. 
 
Due to this obvious interactivity, it seems reasonable to discuss 
the principles of structure and functioning of the central nervous 
system in the same chapter with the theories and models that refer to 
them. The four principles are: 
1) Hierarchical organization, higher levels provide greater 
precision. Neurons respond to increasingly abstract aspects of 
complex stimuli as the distance, measured by the number of synapses 
from the source, increases (reflex arc) 
2) Parallel processing, bits of information do not travel along a 
single pathway. Various aspects of the same sensation are processed 
in parallel ways (visual stimuli). 
3) Plasticity: This is the ability of the central nervous system to 
adapt or change under the influence of exogenous or endogenous 
factors. 
4) Lateralization of functions: both parts of the brain are 
anatomically and functionally asymmetrical. 




7. Assumptions on language use in context 
 
The primary purpose of language is to communicate with other 
humans; thus, an accurate understanding of the properties of language 
requires understanding how language is used to create meaning. In 
terms of Cognitive Linguistics, the commitment to analyzing extended 
text is perhaps most apparent in Mental Space Theory and Blending 
Theory, which attempt to model the complexities inherent in human 
knowledge representation and linguistic processing, with particular 
focus on shifts in viewpoint and perspective in naturally occurring 
discourse. However, many other strands of Cognitive Linguistics have 
also been driven by observations of contextualized language use. 
 
Another key area of convergence is the shared recognition of the 
central importance of organized background knowledge in human 
cognition generally and in creating and interpreting language in 
particular. Certainly discourse analysts have long recognized schema 
in relation to interactional routines and scripts. While discourse 
analysts clearly recognize the centrality of schema in interpretation of 
the ‘ideational,’ much of their concern has been on the affective, 
interpersonal, and actional. In contrast, Cognitive Linguists have 
focused more on the nature of cognition and how it is reflected in the 
linguistic code and rather less on the interpersonal and interactional 
realms. In particular, they have emphasized that language is a 
reflection of human cognition which stems from a language user who 
is endowed with a particular physical and neurological architecture 
that includes rich, complex cognitive capacities, including richly 
structured memory, as she interacts with the external, social-physical 
world. Basic to the perspective is the idea that humans do not have 
direct, objective access to the external world; rather what humans 
have direct access to their conceptualization of the world. 
 
Cognitive Grammar, Mental Space and Blending Theory, 
Construction Grammar, ethnomethodology, and interactional 
sociolinguistics are just some of the frameworks used by the 
researchers within a usage-based approach to language. There implied 
a set of shared tenets concerning language as it occurs in natural 
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contexts include the following: 1) when humans use language, they do 
so primarily for the purpose of communicating with other human 
beings; 2) communication always occurs in a context; and 3) language 
is shaped by its social-cultural nature; and 4) language is inevitably 
shaped by the nature of human cognition. 
 
8. Benefits of merging disciplines 
 
This study integrates empirical methodology from fields of 
neuroscience and cognitive psychology into questions of discourse-
comprehension previously considered not empirically verifiable and 
even “non-scientific.” The answer to any and all of my questions 
should do two things: provide new tools for practitioners and open 
new doors of research and conversation within the academy. 
 
I believe that we have only just begun to understand 
ramifications of language in other fields, based on the fact that 
thinking and language attempt to capture and represent. This 
privileging of imagination, creativity, and the body is part of the 
reason I find the integration of cognitive science into discourse studies 
so productive. While I believe that such interdisciplinary travels 
require rigor and caution, I do also believe that cognitive linguistics 
operates to open up new horizons of research questions and answers. 
Until the debate is settled, any application of cognitive science to the 
humanities should foreground the paradigm in which it operates to 
explain the aesthetic, emotional, and cognitive experiences that matter 
the most to us (p. 16). 
 
The separation between the “two fields” is invented and 
unproductive. Many scholars allude to literature and art as involved in 
a relationship with the human biology, psychology, or neurology, yet 
few put pressure on how this might work or what it might mean given 
historical or contemporary scientific epistemology (Cook 2010, p. 42). 
This is not to say that the disciplinary walls should come crashing 
down or that all work is most fruitfully done at or on the wall. We 
should know whether our idea of how language works (cognitively as 
well as culturally) matches the evidence collected within cognitive 
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linguistics that depicts a linguistic system based on profound 
creativity and instability. 
The engagement between the disciplines has already provided 
exciting work and promises to continue to reshape scholarship in the 
academy. The movement across disciplines comes from an urge to 
answer questions unanswered in one’s own; the questions being asked 
at the intersection of literature and cognitive science seem to be: how 
does a new concept of how language and thinking work alter our 
understanding of classic plays? What can a study of linguistic 
processing tell us about a historical period or the brain of the person 
who wrote the language? Along this interdisciplinary coastline there 
are different research agendas and questions. What the scientists want 
to know is how did Shakespeare write a soliloquy that could and 
would be quoted by all English-speaking high school graduates? How 
do we remember it and why does it interest us? How is it that a change 
of brain created a change of mind? How we process and express 
information could be traced to what was inside and how the parts 
worked to make up the whole. 
 
9. Some Empirical Evidence 
 
Caplan, Dapretto, and Mazziotta (2000) have shown in fMRI 
studies of healthy subjects that different neural networks are involved 
in different aspects of discourse coherence. Logic is controlled by the 
left hemisphere, primarily by the middle and superior temporal gyrus, 
but also by the inferior frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate. 
Aparticularly high activation was recorded when the responses were 
illogical, whereas in logical ones it was somewhat more evenly 
distributed in both hemispheres. 
 
On the other hand, maintaining the topic of conversation is 
controlled by the right hemisphere, primarily by the inferior frontal 
gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and the cerebellum. Responses that 
deviated from the topic increasingly activated precisely these areas. 
These results confirmed earlier observations of brain-injured patients. 
Faust, Barak, and Chiarello (2005) also found that the right 
hemisphere contributes to discourse comprehension by maintaining 
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widespread meaning activation over an extended period of time, thus 
monitoring the coherence. Xu, Kemeny, Park, Frattali, and Braun 
(2005) found the right hemisphere to be increasingly active as 
contextual complexity increased. 
 
Kuperberg et al. (2000) used fMRI on healthy subjects to study 
neural activity during listening to correct spoken sentences and 
compared it with the activity recorded during listening to sentences 
that were pragmatically, semantically, or syntactically anomalous. All 
three contrasts revealed robust activation in the left inferior temporal 
and fusiform gyrus. Studies using PET and fMRI techniques have 
shown that written language relies on the same neural substrate at its 
input level as other visual stimuli. In other words, the first steps in 
visual processing of words will be identical to those in processing any 
other form; words will be analyzed one feature at a time (curvature 
and slant of the lines, etc.). 
 
The process of writing proceeds through several stages: 
planning, sentence generation, and revision (usually in that order). On 
average, the planning stage takes about 30% of the time, sentence 
generation about 50%, and the revision stage the remaining 20%. 
More knowledgeable individuals write with less effort, but not 
necessarily better than those with less knowledge. Good writers use 
longer sentences (on average 11.2 words), or longer segments, than 
average writers (7.3 words). Skillful writers spend more time on text 
revision than average or poor writers, and their interventions are 
related to content rather than to individual words or phrases (Hayes & 
Flower, as cited in Eysenck & Keane, 2000). 
 
Despite the importance of the planning and revision stages, the 
sentence generation stage has been the most extensively studied. 
Many authors agree that writing depends on internal speech to a great 
extent. This means that writers actually produce the words before they 
write them down. According to this hypothesis, writing would rely on 
the same neural structures that are involved in speech, in addition to 
those that are related to the actual motor activity associated with 
writing. 
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The restrictions in a poem, on logical or force-dynamic and 
spatial consistency are not the same as in argumentative or narrative 
texts. Therefore the possible divergence between results of the 
construction intended by the author and reconstructed by the 
reader/hearer does not dramatically endanger the poetic text. On the 
contrary, Celan cites Pascal, a very geometrically minded French 
philosopher of the 17th century, who said: “Ne nous reprochez pas le 
manque de clarté, car nous en faisons profession » (translation: Do not 
reproach us the lack of clarity, because we intend it). Nevertheless the 
poet does his best to be precise, to come the nearest he can to his 
expressive goal. The lack of clarity is just the consequence of the fact 
that the poetic text is not argumentative and thus does not have to 
follow the rules of logic; it is not narrative, and thus the 
spatial/temporal/causal unity is not its primary goal. 
 
Understanding discourse requires the comprehension of 
individual words and sentences, as well as integration across sentence 
representations to form a coherent understanding of the discourse as a 
whole. The processes that achieve this coherence involve a dynamic 
interplay between mental representations built on the current sentence, 
the prior discourse context, and the comprehender’s background 
(world) knowledge. In this chapter, we outline the cognitive and 
linguistic processes that support discourse comprehension and explore 
the functional neuroanatomy of text and discourse processing. 
 
Many linguistic theories have addressed the relationship 
between language and thought (e.g., Talmy 2000, 2007; Evans and 
Green, 2006; Langacker, 2000; Tomasello, 2003). In particular, 
lexicogrammatical structures in language appear to be systematically 
related to cognitive structures and processes. This structural fact 
carries over to principles of language in use: the way we think is 
related to the way we talk. This is true both generally in terms of what 
we can do with language, and specifically with respect to what we 
actually do. 
 
Evidence from the cognitive neuroscience of text and discourse 
processing generally supports the assumption that areas of the brain 
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that are active during sentence comprehension also support the 
comprehension of connected text. When listeners encode sentences, 
left hemisphere language mechanisms are involved in perceiving 
words, encoding their meanings, parsing the sentence, and integrating 
the meanings across sentences. The resulting integration of 
information is realized at two levels: (1) coherent semantic 
representations of successive clauses and sentences that are subject to 
verbatim memory loss at clause and sentence boundaries and (2) a 





Investigations of neuropsychological functioning in multiple 
language users offer much promise in answering questions originating 
from cognitive as well as biological approaches to language. For 
example, organizational structure reduces processing load in the 
prefrontal cortex during discourse processing of written text, which 
may have implications for high-level reading issues after TBI. 
 
One key challenge for future work will be to reconcile 
contradictory evidence on the role of the right hemisphere in 
establishing coherence in discourse comprehension. Another topic that 
is ripe for future research concerns the nature of syntactic processes, 
and their interactions with communicative processes. Also, 
neuroimaging studies of discourse comprehension may add to our 
understanding of individual differences. We further suggest for future 
research to tackle any of the following questions: 
· How can the ambiguity of such nonce compounds be 
controlled? Are they able to create a richer field of possible 
interpretations? 
· Will the hearer/reader be able to reconstruct the cognitive 
pathway of the author or will he at least come to a similar experience? 
· How will the space of solutions to the problem of 
interpretation be coordinated with the interpretation of the words, 
phrases and sentences which stand in the context of the compound; i.e. 
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will the compound properly contribute to the global meaning of the 
text? 
· Does a one-to-one mapping of neuro-physiological levels of 
brain activity to cognitive behavioural levels really enhance 
educational pedagogy? 
· What is the relationship between double-loop learning, 
reflexive practice, learning styles and neurophysiology? 
· Does human cognition rely on structured internal 
representations? 
· How should theories, models and data relate? 
· In what ways might embodiment, action and dynamics matter 
for understanding the mind and the brain? 
 
We can turn to examine ways in which the Person-based 
discourse, the Organism-based discourse and the Molecule-based 
discourse are related to one another.  
 
The idea that cognitive tasks often require the use of material 
tools introduces the metaphor of "brain-as-tool". A certain electronic 
device is a "calculator" only in relation to the task it is used to 
perform. Similarly a certain region of the brain is the organ of 
calculation only in relation to the task we use it to perform. Finally 
there are cognitive tasks for which we use cognitive or symbolic tools, 
for instance reasoning carried on with propositions. To produce a 
statement, expressing a proposition, which is to serve as a tool in the 





The objective in this paper has been to give some indication of 
the multidisciplinary range of discourse analysis, to identify and 
describe some of its gradually emerging landmarks (the “ways and 
means,” the “focusing”. Having shifted focus of our enquiries from 
the misconceived puzzle about how two wholly disjoint substances 
could interact, and avoiding the complementary pitfall of the attempt 
to build a human science on the basis of one or other Crinion and 
Price (2005) investigated (by means of fMRI) narrative speech 
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activation in left-hemisphere stroke patients and normal controls. 
Their results support the role of the right temporal lobe in processing 
narrative speech and auditory sentence comprehension following left 
hemisphere aphasic stroke. 
 
There is simply too much evidence to disregard the idea of 
preexisting conditions in our brain which govern our language 
abilities. Until we better understand the brain and the neuronal basis of 
language, however, the debate is still widely open. To borrow 
Chomsky’s very own words, "it remains to be seen in what respects 
the system that develops is actually shaped by experience, or rather 
reflects intrinsic processes and structures triggered by experience." 
 
Educational neuroscience is generating valuable new knowledge 
to inform educational policy and practice. If the scientific community 
decides not to develop arguments of relationality between 
neurophysiology, cognitive development and learning within the 
educational context then it will remain an unmapped area of 
knowledge. 
 
It is apparent that neurocognitive and analytical approaches to 
language have different concerns from each other. What I call 
analytical linguistics is concerned with analyzing linguistic data, 
utterances, sentences, and the like, and with finding patterns in such 
data, often guided by theoretical concerns that have little cognitive 
basis and usually no neurological basis at all. In neurocognitive 
linguistics, by contrast, while such data is still examined, the object of 
study is the neurocognitive system of the individual. This difference 
of focus has a number of consequences, not least of which is the 
recognition and acceptance that the system of every individual is 
different from that of every other. 
 
More important for the concerns of this paper is that by taking 
the natural operation of the human brain into consideration we 
recognize that linguistic information, like other kinds of information, 
is often represented redundantly in the neurocognitive system. The 
tendency of analytical linguists to seek out the most economical 
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possible means of handling a given body of data is seen to be lacking 
any neurocognitive motivation. 
 
The human cognitive system represents information as 
connectivity in a network. It operates by means of widely distributed 
representations and parallel processing. As a consequence, linguistic 
forms can be recognized or produced by means of different structures 
operating in parallel. The brain thrives on redundancy and on 
multiplicity of strategies. 
 
Many scholars share the belief that the application of cognitive 
science to the discourse studies will work best in a collaborative 
spirit—creating not a master theorist but a diverse group of scholars 
asking different questions using a similar (and rigorous) 
interdisciplinary methodology. Here at the start of the twenty-first 
century, the integration of science and the humanities could provide 
the next century’s big bang. 
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